Cover Story

Why Did
The Savannah
Fail?

In the lore of the nuclear industry, her early retirement proved that nuclear power was not a viable option for commercial shipping. Once again, AEI will discuss why we believe that the conventional wisdom is wrong.

By technical measures, the ship was a success. She performed well at sea, her safety record was impressive, her fuel economy was unsurpassed and her gleaming white paint was never smudged by exhaust smoke.

Her interior was also not typical of bulk freighters; she was endowed with 30 air conditioned staterooms, each with an individual bath, a dining facility that could seat 100 passengers, a lounge that could double as a movie theater, a veranda, a swimming pool and a well stocked library.

She was a fast ship with incredible range. With her 20,000 horsepower nuclear engine her top speed was 23 knots. Savannah was capable of circling the earth 14 times at 20 knots without refueling.

Savannah was not well endowed with cargo space. Her holds could accommodate just 8,500 tons of freight in a total space of 652,000 cubic feet. Many of her competitors were able to transport several times as much cargo. Her streamlined hull made loading the forward holds a labor intensive proposition, which became a significant disadvantage as ports became more and more automated.

Her crew was larger than comparable oil powered ships (67 compared to about 50). Her budget included the maintenance of a separate shore organization for negotiating her port visits and a personalized shipyard facility for completing any needed repairs.

The crew was trained in special schools after completing all training requirements for conventional maritime licenses. The number of people sent through the training and attributed to the Savannah's books indicates a plan for the eventual construction of additional nuclear steam ships.

Anyone familiar with the bulk shipping market could immediately recognize that a ship with Savannah's characteristics could not be a commercial proposition. Her passenger space was wasted while her cargo capacity was insufficient.

Having a unique propulsion plant increased the cost of repairs and spare parts relative to machines with a larger installed base of customers. The large crew of hand-picked people added even more costs. Expecting her to make money as a bulk freighter was like expecting an auto show concept car to make money as a jitney taxi.

As a result of her design handicaps, Savannah consumed approximately $2 million more per year in operating subsidies during her four year career in international trade than a similarly sized Mariner class ship with an oil heated steam plant. This extra subsidy became a target for economy-minded legislators.

In 1972, when Savannah was laid up, the cost of a ton of oil was about $20.00. A ship with a 20,000 horsepower engine using 1970s technology would have burned about 120 tons per day for a daily fuel cost of about $2,400. By early 1974, following the Arab Oil Embargo, a ton of bunker fuel cost about $80.00. That same ship's daily fuel bill would have suddenly increased to more than $9,000. Savannah's fuel cost would not have changed as a result of the Oil Embargo. If the oil-burning ship operated for 330 days per year (which is common in the world of merchant shipping), the increase in its annual fuel expenditure would have more than eliminated the difference in Savannah's operating costs, even with all of her inherent disadvantages.